

REMARKS

Claims 1-10 and 25-44 remain pending in this application. Claims 1-4, 9, 10, 25-28, 33-38, 43 and 44 stand rejected. Claims 5-8, 29-32 and 39-42 stand objected to. Additionally, the Examiner indicated that claims 5-8, 29-32 and 39-42 would be allowable if rewritten in independent form.

Claims 1-4, 9-10, 35-38 and 43-44 stand rejected under 35 USC 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,483,359 (**Lee**) in view of (**Johnson**). Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection.

In the Final Office Action dated January 8, 2007, the Examiner addresses one of Applicant's various arguments provided in the previous Response to Office Action. In the Final Office Action, the Examiner asserted that **Lee** allegedly discloses transistive capacitive delay and asserts that the capacitance of delay circuits are activated by transition of gate voltages applied to gate switches. However, as described in greater detail below, **Lee** simply does not disclose transistive capacitances as called for by claims of the present invention. Under the Examiner's theory, even a light bulb that is switched by a gate switch would become an active transistive device, which is simply incorrect reasoning. Simply because passive capacitive may or may not be activated by a different set of switches, does not make them transistive capacitances. This is described in greater detail below. Further, as described below, **Johnson**, does not make up for this deficit for various reasons. In the Final Office Action, the Examiner did not address these arguments and simply reasserted that **Johnson** comprises transistive capacitors. **Johnson** simply discloses passive capacitors (72a-1). Simply because capacitances are disclosed in an alternative prior art reference does not mean those skilled in the art would apply it the way it is called for by

claims of the present invention. The Examiner provides no real connection between the prior art references, and as further described below, without using improper hindsight reasoning, *Jonhson* and *Lee* would not be combined to make obvious all of the elements of the claims of the present invention.

Contrary to the Examiner's assertions in the Final Office Action, Applicants respectfully assert that the combination of *Lee* and *Johnson* does not teach, disclose, or make obvious all of the elements of claim 1 of the present invention. Applicant respectfully asserts that all of the elements of independent claims 1 and 35 are not taught, disclosed, or suggested by *Lee*. The Examiner merely listed a few elements, such as a phase detector, a first delay line and a second delay line and a feedback line of *Lee* to assert anticipation of claims 1 and 35. The Examiner merely provides conclusory statements equating the delay lines of *Lee* to the course delay circuit and the fine delay called for by claims of the present invention. In other words, the Examiner merely lists various reference numbers next to certain words out of the elements of claims of the present invention. *Johnson* does not make up for this deficit. Applicant respectfully asserts that *Lee* and *Johnson* does not teach, disclose, or suggest all of the elements of claims 1 and 35 of the present invention.

The Examiner uses the capacitors (capacitor 60 of Figure 3 and capacitors 72a-72l of Figure 4) of *Johnson* and the capacitors C1, C2, C3, in Figures 4, and 6A through 6D of *Lee* to argue anticipation of elements of the claims of the present invention. However, Applicant respectfully asserts that claims 1 and 35 of the present invention call for a delay lock loop that comprises a delay circuit for activating a transistive capacitive delay. In contrast, the disclosure of *Lee* merely refers to a passive capacitor that may be connected to the inverted clock signal, as described in Figures 4 and 6A-6D of *Lee*. Further, *Johnson* doesn't make up for this deficit.

The Examiner provides no explanation or arguments as to how the disclosure of **Lee** anticipates elements of claims of the present invention. Further, **Lee** simply does not disclose a transistive capacitive delay, as called for by claims 1 and 35 of the present invention. Various advantages of implementing the present invention are achieved over the prior art. For example, the Specification discloses the issue of an RC time constant that may become problematic when applying the standard passive capacitor, as disclosed by **Lee**. Further, utilizing the transistive capacitive elements, an advantage of providing for a relatively constant capacitance during voltage transitions may be achieved, which is a feature that is not provided by **Lee**. See Specification, p.19, lines 3-15. Therefore, various exemplary advantages may be achieved utilizing the transistive capacitive disclosed by claims 1 and 35. **Lee** simply does not disclose activating a transistive capacitive delay, as called for claims 1 and 35 of the present invention. Therefore, **Lee** clearly does not anticipate all of the elements of claims 1 and 35 of the present invention.

The Examiner attempts to make up for the deficit of **Lee** by adding the disclosure of **Johnson** to make obvious the transistor capacitor delay. Aside from being non-analogous art, **Johnson** does not make up for the deficits of **Lee**.

In the Final Office Action, the Examiner asserted that **Johnson** and **Lee** would be combined by those skilled in the art because they both relate to delay circuit. However, this is an overbroad assessment, under which one could use improper hindsight reasoning to combine just about any prior art reference to tailor arguments for obviousness. Clearly, this is improper. **Johnson** is merely directed to a system for synchronizing the operation of a CPU and a co-processor. **Johnson** discloses a FPC chip 20 capable of accessing system data-bus in order to synchronize the data access. See column 3, lines 1-5. **Johnson** discloses a phase detector that

supplies an output indicative of the phase difference of the signals received on line 18, which is a CPU output enable signal and on line 19, which is an FPC output enable signal. *See* column 3, lines 5-8. Therefore, the phase detector of **Johnson** is not directed towards data transfer, it is directed towards enabling two different entities. **Johnson** does not disclose a feedback signal for using the phase detector. Therefore, **Johnson** is entirely different and non-analogous to **Lee** and those skilled in the art would not be motivated to combine them to make obvious all of the elements of claims of the present invention.

The present invention calls for detecting the phase difference between a reference signal and a feedback signal and then using a delay circuit for activating a transistive capacitive delay. These are elements that are not disclosed or suggested by either **Lee** or **Johnson**, or a combination of the two. **Johnson** does not disclose or make obvious transistive capacitances. The Examiner incorrectly identifies the capacitors 72a-72l in Figure 4 as a transistive capacitor. The Examiner is false in this assertion. The capacitors shown in Figure 4 (72a-72l) are actually simple passive capacitors whose connection is influenced by the transistors 71a-71l. *See* Figure 4 of **Johnson**. **Johnson** clearly discloses that the delay line in Figure 4 consists of a series of drivers and control transistors 71a-71l and 12 capacitors 72a-72l. *See*, column 4, lines 39-44. Therefore, neither **Lee** nor **Johnson** discloses or makes obvious a transistive capacitor. Similarly, the Examiner's citation of the capacitor 60 in Figure 3 of **Johnson** is also similarly false since the capacitor 60 is simply a passive capacitor. Contrary to the Examiner's position, in the Final Office Action, simply because a passive capacitor is switched by a switch doesn't make it a transistive capacitance. This is clearly improper hindsight tailoring of arguments based upon prior art. In the Final Office Action, the Examiner merely asserts that the capacitors in **Johnson** are transistive, without providing reasoning. Accordingly, **Johnson** also has all of the

weaknesses of **Lee** and the combination of **Johnson** and **Lee** do not teach, disclose or suggest all of the elements of the claims of the present invention.

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. As described above, the combination of **Lee** and **Johnson** do not teach or suggest all of the elements of claims 1 and 35 of the present invention.

Second, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Applicant respectfully asserts that the Examiner has provided no evidence, nor is there any evidence in the cited prior art that would provide an indication of motivation of those skilled in the art to combine **Lee** and **Johnson** to read upon all of the elements of claims 1 and 35 of the present invention. Contrary to the Examiner's contention, those skilled in the art simply would not find motivation to combine **Johnson** and **Lee**. The Examiner stated that those skilled in the art would combine **Johnson** and **Lee** for the purpose of reducing size by employing the transistive capacitor. There are two flaws in this reasoning. First, neither **Johnson** nor **Lee** discloses transistive capacitors. Secondly, reduction of size is not a motivation to use the transistive capacitor, there are other motivations exemplified above, such as the advantage of providing a relatively constant capacitance during voltage transitions. These are motivations that are not addressed or anticipated by **Lee** nor **Johnson**. Without improper hindsight, those skilled in the art simply would not find the motivation to combine the delay lock loop of **Lee** with the data path disclosure of **Johnson** to make obvious all of the elements of claims 1 and 35. Therefore, there is no evidence or motivation, either in the references

themselves or in the knowledge, generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings.

Third, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on Applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991); M.P.E.P. § 2142. There is no evidence that the improbable combination of **Lee** and **Johnson** provide a reasonable expectation of success. There is no evidence to a contrary assertion, and the Examiner fails to provide any evidence of reasonable expectation of success based upon the prior art. Therefore, the Examiner failed to establish a *prima facie* evidence of obviousness with respect to claims 1 and 35 of the present invention. Accordingly, for a least the reasons described above **Lee** and **Johnson** do not cause all of the elements of claims 1 and 35 to be taught, disclosed, or suggested. The Examiner failed to show a *prima facie* case of obviousness of claims 1 and 35. Accordingly, independent claims 1 and 35 are allowable. Further, dependent claims 1-4, 9-10 which depend from claims 1, and claims 36-38, 43-44, which depend from claim 35, are also allowable for at least the reasons cited herein.

Claims 1-4, 9-10, 25-28, 33-38 and 43-44 remain rejected under 35 USC 103(a) as being unpatentable over **Baker** (US 6,445,231) in view of **Lee** (US 6,483,359) and further in view of **Johnson** (US 5,101,117). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

Contrary to the Examiner's assertion in the Final Office Action, as described above, **Lee** clearly does not disclose many of the elements of claim 1 of the present invention. The inclusion of **Johnson** and **Baker** does not make up for this deficit. The Examiner stated that **Baker** does not disclose the DLL circuit comprising delay circuit as recited in claims 1, 25 (as amended), and

35. The Examiner then uses **Lee** and **Johnson** to make up for this deficit. However, **Baker** clearly does not disclose the delay circuit at all, much less a delay circuit for activating a transistive capacitor delay. As described above, neither **Lee** nor **Johnson** discloses a delay circuit for activating a transitive capacitor delay. Therefore, the combination of **Baker**, **Lee** and **Johnson**, does not teach, disclose, or suggest all of the elements of claim 1 of the present invention. Hence, the first prong of showing a *prima facie* obviousness is not shown.

Further, those skilled in the art would not combine **Baker** with **Lee** and/or **Johnson** to make obvious all of the elements of claim 1 of the present invention. Simply because **Lee** and **Johnson** disclose a DLL loop, the Examiner failed to provide any evidence motivation why those skilled in the art would combine them to make obvious the elements of claim 1, 25, and 35 of the present invention, particularly, the delay circuit for activating a transistive capacitive delay. Nothing in **Lee** discloses or suggests that those skilled in the art would look for a solution for the transistive capacitor delay and attempt to combine any prior art cited. Hence, the second prong of showing a *prima facie* obviousness is not shown.

Additionally, there is no evidence that the improbable combination of **Baker**, **Lee** and **Johnson** provide a reasonable expectation of success. There is no evidence to a contrary assertion, and the Examiner fails to provide any evidence of reasonable expectation of success based upon the prior art. Hence, the third prong of showing a *prima facie* obviousness is not shown. However, as described above, even if all of the cited prior art were combined, all of the elements of claims 1, 25, and 35 of the present invention would not be taught, disclosed or suggested. As described above, the Examiner failed to provide a *prima facie* showing of obviousness of claims 1, 25, and 35. Therefore, independent claims 1, 25, and 35 of the present invention are allowable for at least the reasons cited herein. Further, dependent claims 1-4, 9-10,

which depend from claim 1; claims 26-28, 33-34, which depend from claim 25; and claims 36-38, 43-44, which depend from claim 35 are also allowable for at least the reasons cited herein.

Applicant acknowledges and appreciate that the Examiner has indicated that claims 5-8, 29-32 and 39-41 contain allowable subject matter; however, in light of the arguments presented herein, all pending claims of the present invention are allowable. Therefore, Applicant respectfully solicits a Notice of Allowance, allowing claims 1-10 and 25-44 of the present invention.

In light of the arguments presented above, Applicant respectfully asserts that claims 1-10 and 25-44 are allowable.

If for any reason the Examiner finds the application other than in condition for allowance, **the Examiner is requested to call the undersigned attorney** at the Houston, Texas telephone number (713) 934-4069 to discuss the steps necessary for placing the application in condition for allowance.

Respectfully submitted,

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